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      Honorable Joseph E. Irenas, Senior United States District Judge for the District of*
New Jersey, sitting by designation.
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                                                                                     NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
            
No. 06-1540
            
MARK JACKSON,
                                      Appellant
v.
ROHM & HAAS COMPANY; MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP;
CONRAD O'BRIEN GELLMAN & ROHN, P.C.; ROBERT VOGEL, Esquire; 
CELIA JOSEPH, Esquire; ROYCE WARRICK, Esquire; 
MICHAEL MCLAUGHLIN,  Esquire;
WAYNE DAVIS; DAVID GARTENBERG; ELLEN FRIEDEL, Esquire;
JANE GREENETZ; JAMES D. PAGLIARO, Esquire;
PAUL J. GRECO, Esquire; P. DAFFODIL TYMINSKI, Esquire;
ARETHA DELIGHT DAVIS, Esquire; NANCY GELLMAN, Esquire;
WILLIAM O'BRIEN, Esquire; KELLY G. HULLER, Esquire;
JUNE MCCRORY, JOHN DOE, Nos. 1-25
          
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
D.C. Civil No. 03-cv-05299
District Judge: Honorable Louis H. Pollak
         
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
February 2, 2007
Before: BARRY, ROTH, Circuit Judges, and IRENAS,  Senior District Judge.*
      The parties dispute whether McCrory or a co-worker reported the incident to R&H’s1
Human Resources Representative. 
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(Filed    February 26, 2007)
         
OPINION
         
IRENAS, Senior United States District Judge.
Appellant Mark Jackson appeals the District Court’s decision dismissing his
Amended Complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim under
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. § 1961, et
seq.  We will affirm.
I.
Rohm and Haas (R&H) employed Jackson in 1992 as a C.P.A. in its Financial
Reporting and Analysis Division.  On the night of June 26, 1998, Jackson and a co-
worker, June McCrory, spent an evening together in which they had a sexual encounter
that McCrory alleged was not consensual.  R&H conducted an investigation of the events
when it was informed of the allegation.   1
In 1999, Jackson filed two actions in the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas,
claiming invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and defamation
arising out of the investigation.  Judge Colins consolidated the two actions and held a
trial.  The jury returned a verdict in favor of Jackson for $150,000, finding that R&H was
liable for invading Jackson’s privacy.  The jury also found that McCrory defamed
      Pennsylvania’s WCA bars suits against employers for work-related injuries. Kline v.2
Arden H. Verner Co., 503 Pa. 251 (1983).  Judge Colins found such injuries to include
those sustained by Jackson due to the R&H investigation.  
      On September 19, 2005, Jackson filed a second Complaint in the Eastern District of3
Pennsylvania (“Jackson II”), which was also assigned to Judge Pollak.   In it, he
complained that the defendants in this litigation (“Jackson I”), their lawyers, and Liberty
Life, R&H’s disability insurance administrator, engaged in wrongdoing during the
litigation of Jackson I in the District Court.  Jackson contended that all defendants in
Jackson II, except Liberty Life, acted fraudulently by presenting the same documents
produced in state court that he claimed were doctored.  Additionally, he alleged that
Liberty Life conspired with R&H to deprive him of disability benefits that were
purportedly owed to him.  Based upon these allegations, Jackson complained of RICO
violations, as well as violations of state law.  Because Judge Pollak found that his
decision in Jackson I made it clear that Jackson lacked standing to bring a RICO claim, he
sanctioned Johnson’s attorney pursuant to Rule 11 for bringing unwarranted and frivolous
RICO claims.  The Court also imposed sanctions for the conspiracy allegations as being
meritless and frivolous.  Jackson then twice amended his Complaint to allege claims
arising out of conduct connected to his receipt of disability benefits.  These claims are
currently pending before Judge Pollak.   
3
Jackson, but did not award damages on that claim.  R&H moved for judgment not
withstanding the verdict (“JNOV”), which the Court granted because it found that
Jackson’s claim of invasion of privacy was barred by the Pennsylvania Workers’
Compensation Act (“WCA”), 77 Pa.C.S.A. § 1, et seq.   Jackson appealed to the Superior2
Court, which denied his appeal and subsequent petition for a rehearing en banc.  The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied his Petition for Allowance to Appeal.  
On September 19, 2003, Jackson filed an action in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania.   In his Amended Complaint,  Jackson averred that defendants made3
fraudulent representations to the state court, in violation of RICO and several state laws. 
The District Court dismissed Jackson’s Amended Complaint in its entirety, holding that
4Jackson lacked RICO standing, the only independent basis of federal jurisdiction, and
refused to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.  It
subsequently denied Jackson’s reconsideration motion. This appeal followed.
II.
This Court has jurisdiction to review the District Court’s order dismissing the
Amended Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review the dismissal of Jackson’s
Amended Complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) de novo.  Dobrek v. Phelan, 419
F.3d 259, 263 (3d Cir. 2005)(“the Court should affirm the District Court’s dismissal only
if it appears that the Plaintiff could prove no set of facts that would entitle him to relief.”); 
Mariana v. Fisher, 338 F.3d 189, 195 (3d Cir. 2003), cert denied, 540 U.S. 1179 (2004). 
The District Court’s denial of Jackson’s motion for reconsideration is reviewed for abuse
of discretion when based upon an issue of fact, and is reviewed for clear error when
predicated on an issue of law.  See Max’s Seafood Café by Lou-Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros,
176 F.3d 669, 673 (3d Cir. 1999);  North River Ins. Co. v. CIGNA Reinsurance Co., 52
F.3d 1194, 1203 (3d Cir. 1995).  
III.
The first issue is whether Jackson stated a claim under RICO such that the District
Court had an independent basis of jurisdiction over Jackson’s claims.  A plaintiff bringing
a civil RICO claim must show that: (1) he suffered an injury to his business or property,
and (2) the alleged injury was proximately caused by defendant’s racketeering activity. 
      In support of these contentions, Jackson makes assertions about defendants’ conduct4
that are irrelevant and were already considered and rejected in the state court proceedings
below, as well as by the District Court in Jackson I and Jackson II.  Because they have no
bearing on the legal questions before us, we decline to address them. 
       Jackson also contends that RICO liability can be premised upon defendants’5
obstruction of justice stemming from the alleged fraud upon the state courts and
submission of the state court record as exhibits to defendants’ motion to dismiss in the
District Court.  This claim was not pled in Jackson’s Amended Complaint, but was
nevertheless argued before the District Court.  Even were it pled, however, Jackson’s
5
Maio v. Aetna Inc., 221 F.3d 472, 483 (3d Cir. 2000).  
Jackson’s RICO claim is based upon his assertion that defendants conspired to
commit fraud on the state court, and then again on the District Court, by using altered
documents to support their position in the underlying invasion of privacy and defamation
action.    He argues that such conduct caused the state court to grant defendant R&H’s4
motion for JNOV, and because the judgment was fraudulently obtained, it is void.
The state trial court, however, expressly stated in granting defendant’s motion for
JNOV that its decision was premised upon the fact that Jackson’s claims were barred by
the Pennsylvania WCA and not on any documents submitted or actions taken by
defendants in the course of the state court litigation.  The Superior Court affirmed the
order granting JNOV. 
Because the state courts’ decisions were not based upon the evidence presented at
trial, but rather upon the WCA’s coverage for any harm caused Jackson by the
investigation, we hold that Jackson cannot show that his injury was proximately caused
by any alleged racketeering activities.5
claim fails because he cannot show proximate causation, and cannot circumvent this
requirement by simply raising an additional theory of liability. 
       The District Court permitted Jackson to file two amendments to his motion for6
reconsideration.  Its ruling was based upon the arguments set forth in the second amended
motion.  
6
IV.
A motion for reconsideration should be made only to “correct manifest errors of
law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence.”  Harsco Corp. v. Zlotnicki,  779
F.2d 906, 909 (3d Cir. 1985). 
In his motion for reconsideration,  Jackson argued that there are two grounds for6
reconsidering the order dismissing the case: (1) the District Court misunderstood the
character of the state court proceedings and the state court’s decision to grant the JNOV,
as well as the affirmation of that decision by the Superior Court; and (2) the District Court
erred in failing to retain jurisdiction over the state law claims.  
 The District Court, in its opinion dismissing Jackson’s Amended Complaint,
clearly articulated the grounds for the state court decisions below, quoting directly from
those decisions in explaining them.  (JA 17).  Judge Pollak ruled upon the motion to
reconsider from the bench and found that the Court did not misapprehend the state court
proceedings or determinations. (JA 658-60).  Because we agree that there were no
manifest errors of law or fact, and no new evidence was presented, we hold that the
District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Jackson’s motion for reconsideration. 
  Jackson’s second argument, that the District Court should have retained 
7jurisdiction over the supplemental state law claims, is also unavailing.  A District Court
has the discretion whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims
when no federal claims remain in the case.  28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (“The district courts
may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim ... if ... the district court has
dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction). See also Queen City Pizza v.
Domino’s Pizza, 124 F. 3d 430, 333 (3d Cir. 1997)(the decision to decline supplemental
jurisdiction over a plaintiff’s remaining state law claims “is committed to the sound
discretion of the district court.”). It was not clearly erroneous for the District Court to
refuse to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims, particularly where
the sole federal claim is found to be wholly lacking in merit.
V.
For the reasons set forth above, the judgments of the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania dismissing the Amended Complaint and denying the motion for
reconsideration will be affirmed.            
